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A b s t r a c t 
For (S; E) a measurable space, let C1 and C2 be convex, weak* closed 
sets of probabil ity measures on E. We show that i f C1UC2 satis…es the Lya-
punov property then there exists a set A G E such that minM12C1 M1 (A) > 
maxM22C2 A^(A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Ut i l i t y and 
to the core of a lower probability. 
1 Main result 
I f / i 1 and / i 2 are two probab i l i t y measures on a cr-algebra £ , t hen (by de…ni-
t ion) / i 1 = / i 2 means t h a t there exists a set A £ E such t h a t / ^ ( A ) > / i 2 ( A ) . 
Equivalent ly , the two dis jo int sets 1 /^ } and { / i 2 } can be separated by means of 
a l inear funct iona l hav ing an especially simple fo rm, namely one t h a t is de…ned 
by an ind icator func t ion . Here, we are concerned w i t h extending th is p roper ty 
t o sets of measures which are not singletons. Our mo t i va t i on stems f rom some 
questions ar is ing i n the theory of decision mak ing under uncerta inty. We o¤er 
a simple app l ica t ion t o th is area after we prove our separat ion result . However, 
given i ts nature, we expect our result t o be widely appl icable i n areas di¤erent 
f rom the one we consider. 
Let (S; S) be a measurable space and let A ( S ) denote the set of a l l (countably 
addi t ive) p robab i l i t y measures on S. A ( £ ) is a subset of the no rm dua l of the 
Banach space B ( S ) of bounded, S-measurable funct ions. 
D e … n i t i o n 1 Let C = { / i i } i G I C A ( £ ) . We say that C has the Lyapunov 
property if the range of the vector measure ( / i i ) i € I on E is a convex and compact 
subset of MiI (equipped with the product topology), for all E £ E . 
Not ice t h a t i f C has the Lyapunov property , then so does any subset of C. 
Sets of measures w i t h the Lyapunov proper ty have special impor tance i n the 
theory of decision mak ing under uncerta inty. For a decision maker described 
by a set of pr iors l ike in [8] or i n [7], the Lyapunov proper ty corresponds t o the 
demand t h a t the class of unambiguous events in the sense of [12] or [7] be “ r ich” 
(see Section 2). 
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Theorem 2 Let C1 and C2 be convex, weak* closed subsets ofA(S) such that 
C1 U C2 has the Ly 
A inYi such that 
  apunov property. Then C1 fl C2 = 0 if and only if there exists 
min fJ-1(A) > max /i2(A): 
Proof. Since each Ci is weak* compact, then it is weak compact, and convexity 
of Ci implies that there exist a measure Ai £ Ci such that [ii <C Ai for all [ii £ Ci, 
i = 1;2 (see, for instance [3]). Hence, all the measures in C1 UC2 are absolutely 
continuous with respect to A = 12A1 + 12A2, and the sets C[ and C2 of all Radon-
Nikodym derivatives of elements of C1 and C2 are disjoint, weakly compact, and 
convex subsets of L1(A). The Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see, [4], V.2.10) 
guarantees that there exist g0 £ L°° (A) — {0}, / ? £ l , such that 
min / g0f1d\ > max / g0f2dX: (1) 
f1£C[ f
 2 £ C U 
g
 0 — essinf g0 




 essinf g0 k00 By assumption, C1 UC2 has the Lyapunov property. Hence, C[ UC2 is thin in 
the sense of [10]. By Lemma 1 in [10], g0 = XA + h where A £ Y, and h £ L°°(A) 
is such that J hfdX = 0 for all f £ C{UC2. For all \x £ C1UC2, setting f = dfi=dX 
we have 
/ fdX = / XAfd^ = / 
A 
/i (A) =   (XA + h)fdX = g0fdX 
and Eq. (1) becomes 
The converse is obvious. • 
min fJ-1(A) > max /i2(A) 
Corol lary 3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, C1 C C2 if and only if 
minM1gC1 M1 (A) > minM2eC2 M2 (A) for all A £Y,. 
Proof. Let minM1gC1 M1 (A) > minM2gC2 M2 (A) for all A £ S. Assume that 
C1 is not contained in C2. Then there exists p, £ C1 — C2. Since C2 U {p,} is 
thin, Theorem 2 yields that there exists B £ £ such that /i (B) < / i 2 (B) for 
all / i 2 G C2. Therefore minu aC 1 M1 (B) < u(B) < minu f C 2 u2 (B), which is 
absurd. The converse is trivial. • 
We conclude this section, by proving another separation result. This extends 
an obvious property of two nonatomic measures: if \x1 = / i 2 , there exist A; B £ 
S, A fl B = 0 such that fi1(A) > /^ (B) and /i2(A) < /J,2(B). Notice that this 
is no longer true if the nonatomicity assumption is removed. In this form, the 
separation theorem turns out to be a basic tool in study unambiguous events in 
the sense of [14] and [5] (see [2]). 
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Coro l l a ry 4 Under the assumptions in Theorem 2, there exist A; B £ S, An 
B = 0, such that P1(A) — P1(B) > 0 > p2(A) — p2(B) for any p1 £ C1 and any 
/ i 2 £ C2. 
Proof . Let A g E b e such that p1(A) > /J.2(A) for any /j,i £ Ci, i = 1; 2. Since 
C1 UC2 has the Lyapunov property, the range on S of the vector measure de…ned 
by C1 U C2 is compact and convex. Hence, for any a £ [0;1] there exists B £ £ 
such that P1(B) = p2(B) = a for all pi £ Ci, i = 1;2. Pick one such a B 
so that 2p(B) = m i n ^ d p1 (A) + m a x ^ ^ M2(A) for all P £ C1\J C2. Then, 
P1(A) — P1(B) > 0 and C 2(A) — p2(B) < 0 for all pi £ Ci, i = 1; 2. 
I f A f l B = 0, write B = (A n B) U B ' and A = (A n B) U A'. Then, for any 
Hi £ Ci, i = 1; 2, 
p1(A) — p1(B) = p1(An B) + p1(A') — p1(An B) — p1(B') = p1(A') — p1(B') 
^(A) — p2(B) = p2(A') — p2(B') 
and A' and B ' do the job. • 
2 Application: M E U preferences and lower prob-
abilities 
In the theory of decision making under uncertainty, one is concerned with a 
decision maker ranking the elements of a set A of mappings a : S —> X, where 
S is the state space and X the prize space. For the sake of simplicity, let X be 
a convex subset of a vector space and A be the set of all simple and measurable 
functions from S to X. The decision maker’s ranking >z, is said to satisfy the 
Maxmin Expected Ut i l i ty (MEU) criterion if and only if for a;b £ A 
a ^ b •<=> min / (u o a) dp > min / (uob) dp; 
MGC fi€C 
where u : X —> R is a nonconstant and a¢ne uti l i ty function on the prize 
space, and C is a weak* closed and convex set of …nitely additive probability 
measures on (S; S). The willingness to bet of a MEU decision maker is the lower 
probability 
p (A) = min/i (A); MA £ S: 
Lower (and upper) probabilities are of central importance also in quasi-Bayesian 
statistics (see, for instance [13]). The core of a lower probability p is the set 
core (p) of all …nitely additive probability measures v on (S; S) such that v > p. 
Preferences satisfying the MEU criterion have been axiomatized in [8]. In [11] 
and [3] necessary and su¢cient conditions on >z are given that guarantee that 
all the measures in C be countably additive. An event A £ £ is unambiguous 
in the sense of Nehring [12] or Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [7] if 
p(A) = p'(A) for all p; p' £ C. In [1] (Proposition 4), i t was shown that (i) the 
3 
class of unambiguous events is “rich”, that is there exist unambiguous events 
of measure a for every a £ [0; 1], and (ii) there exists a countably additive, 
nonatomic probability measure on the class of unambiguous events if and only 
if C has the Lyapunov Property. 
In the context of Maxmin Expected Util i ty, a natural question is whether or 
not two MEU preferences with the same uti l i ty on the prize space and the same 
willingness to bet are necessarily the same preference. A related question in the 
theory of lower probabilities is whether or not the weak* closed and convex set 
C de…ning a lower probability p coincides with its core. The following example, 
due to Huber and Strassen [9], answers negatively to both questions. 
Examp le 5 Let S = { 1 ; 2; 3}, X = R, a = (12; 12;0), v = (46; 16; 16). Consider 
ferences, ^1 and ^2, with u1 (x 
sets of priors 
3 + t 3 — t — s s 
two MEU pre ) = u2 (x) = x for any x £ R and 
 t  \ I 
; ; - : 0 < s;t < 1 : 
6 6 6 
It is readily checked that: 
• p1 (A) = m in u f c, u1 (A) = m in u f c, u2 (A) = p2 (A) for all A C S, but 
^:1 is di¤erent from ^ 2 ; 
• C1 is a weak* closed and convex set de…ning the lower probability p1, and 
it is strictly included in core (p1) (which coincides with C2). 
Both conclusions are reverted under the assumptions of Theorem 2 as the 
next two corollaries (both building on Corollary 3) show. In reading Corollary 
6, notice that point 1. amounts to say that ^ 1 is more ambiguity averse than 
^2 (see Ghirardato and Marinacci [6]), and remember that xAy is the mapping 
from S to X taking value x on A and y on Ac. 
Coro l l a ry 6 Let >^ 1 and ^2 be two MEU preferences with (weak* closed and 
convex) sets of priors C1 and C2 contained in A(S) and such that C1 U C2 has 
the Lyapunov property. Then the following conditions are equivalent: 
1. For all a £ A and x £ X, 
a >21 x => a ^2 x: (2) 
2. For …xed x >- y and all A £ S, 
xAy >z1 z => xAy >Z2 z: 
3. u1 is a positive a¢ne transformation of u2 and p1 < p2. 
In particular, if u1 = u2 and p1 = p2, then >^ 1 coincides with ^2. 
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Coro l l a ry 7 Let p be a lower probability such that core (p) C A (£) and core (p) 
has the Lyapunov property. Then core (p) is the weak* closed and convex hull 
of any subset K o f A (£) such that 
p (A) = inf v (A); MA £ S: 
The easy proofs are omitted. 
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